A les 12 hores.

El títol complet és: Mandated Disclosure, Institutional Investors and Price Informativeness: Evidence from the American Inventors Protection Act.

Abstract:

We leverage on the passage of the American Inventors Protection Act of 1999 (AIPA) as an exogenous shock to the firm’s information environment to study the consequences of mandated disclosure regulation on financial market participants. This setting allows us to disentangle the ex ante governance effect embedded in mandatory disclosure from the ex post reduction of information asymmetries. Using a differences-in-differences research design, we document an increase in institutional ownership following the passage of AIPA. Consistent with this disciplinary role of disclosure regulations, lockholders reduce their average stakes, which results in lower ownership concentration and increased market liquidity that stimulates trading by informed investors. Finally, due to this shift in the equilibrium of market participants, we provide evidence that, stock market regulations promoting mandatory disclosure can lead to increases in the informativeness of stock prices even in the absence of actual release of information.

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